Donor political preferences and the allocation of aid: Patterns in recipient type

Zachary D Greene and Amanda A Licht
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Zachary D Greene: 3527University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK
Amanda A Licht: Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, USA

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2024, vol. 41, issue 2, 155-176

Abstract: National executives in Western democracies are not unilateral deciders: they lead parties with long-term policy priorities and manage challenging multiparty coalitions. Leaders of donor states use foreign aid to pursue their goals, including enacting policy output consistent with party ideology. Because preferences for international engagement condition the effect of left–right ideology and coalition government incorporates actors with distinct preferences, we predict that left-pro-internationalist prime ministers and development ministers prefer aiding the neediest recipients while right-internationalists emphasize trade opportunities. Our statistical analysis of OECD donor–potential recipient dyads demonstrates the utility of unpacking democratic domestic politics’ effect on leader incentives and decisions.

Keywords: Coalition governance; domestic politics; foreign aid allocation; political parties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:41:y:2024:i:2:p:155-176

DOI: 10.1177/07388942231195300

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