Nuclear weapons and interstate conflict behavior: The moderating influence of civil–military relations

Rizwan Asghar

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2025, vol. 42, issue 2, 190-219

Abstract: Do nuclear weapons deter aggression or make states more likely to engage in conflict? I argue that we can explain whether and when nuclear capabilities increase state belligerence by examining the role of domestic institutions that shape state security policy. This study provides evidence that nuclear weapons have an emboldening effect on conflict initiation by elevating state capacity but that whether this emboldening translates into higher levels of belligerence depends on the extent to which civilians (relative to the military) control the state, an important dimension of state decision-making. Results provide suggestive evidence in support of my argument. I illustrate this mechanism using the case of Pakistan (1972–2010).

Keywords: Civil–military; conflict; nuclear; Pakistan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:42:y:2025:i:2:p:190-219

DOI: 10.1177/07388942241238649

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