Treaty legalization, security interests, and ratification of multilateral disarmament treaties

Michal Onderco and Valerio Vignoli
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Michal Onderco: 6984Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Valerio Vignoli: 9300University of Florence, Italy

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2025, vol. 42, issue 3, 223-244

Abstract: Multilateral treaties are essential for the effectiveness of global disarmament efforts. Ratification delays have deep repercussions on international cooperation for disarmament. Yet what determines their duration? In this paper, we offer the first comprehensive study of multilateral disarmament treaty ratification, covering the period between 1976 and 2020. We test the effects of treaty legalization and a country's security situation on the ratification duration. States are slower to join treaties with a high degree of obligation, but faster to join treaties with high degrees of precision and delegation. Engagement in inter-state rivalries slows down ratification. In contrast, we find only statistically weak evidence that alliance embeddedness accelerates it.

Keywords: Alliances; disarmament; duration models; legalization; treaty ratification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:42:y:2025:i:3:p:223-244

DOI: 10.1177/07388942241243259

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