Using committee amendments to improve estimates of state foreign policy preferences

Courtenay R Monroe, Nathan W Monroe and Shengkuo Hu
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Courtenay R Monroe: University of California, Merced, USA
Nathan W Monroe: University of California, Merced, USA
Shengkuo Hu: Independent Researcher, Los Angeles, USA

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2025, vol. 42, issue 4, 380-393

Abstract: Ideal point estimates, used as measures of state foreign policy preference, are typically constructed from country votes cast on resolutions in the plenary of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In this article, we argue that revealed preferences on UNGA votes are dependent on the procedural context in which they are cast. We develop a theory of measurement and show empirically that constructing estimates using committee amendment votes yields more precise scores for countries with preferences that do not fall in the center of the policy space. Scholars should consider using both plenary and committee votes when operationalizing foreign policy preferences.

Keywords: ideal points; international organizations; spatial modeling; United Nations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:42:y:2025:i:4:p:380-393

DOI: 10.1177/07388942241267961

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