Alliances, state preferences, and trade networks: The impact of United States sanctions on dual-use trade

Yuleng Zeng and Timothy Peterson
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Yuleng Zeng: 3647University of Groningen, Netherlands
Timothy Peterson: 7864Arizona State University, USA

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2025, vol. 42, issue 6, 624-644

Abstract: Export controls on dual-use commodities are crucial to US foreign policy goals. Research finds that US sanctions motivate third-party compliance with export controls. However, the sanctions-busting literature suggests that allies are more likely than non-allies to sabotage US sanctioning efforts. We argue that US allies export more controlled dual-use goods (CDU) when the importer is not facing US sanctions. However, US allies will not export more CDU than non-allies to US-sanctioned states. We also argue that US sanctions condition the impact of economic and political determinants of CDU trade. We find support in models spanning 1997–2015.

Keywords: Alliance; dual-use; economic sanctions; export control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:42:y:2025:i:6:p:624-644

DOI: 10.1177/07388942241298496

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