Public Policy Implications of Imperfections in the Market for Worker Participation

David l. Levine
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David l. Levine: University of California at Berkeley

Economic and Industrial Democracy, 1992, vol. 13, issue 2, 183-206

Abstract: Increasing worker participation in decision-making can often increase productivity, but remains uncommon in the US. This paper reviews theories of why the market may produce less than the efficient amount of worker participation. A novel policy intervention in which tax subsidies are tied to multiple imperfect measures of participation is proposed.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ecoind:v:13:y:1992:i:2:p:183-206

DOI: 10.1177/0143831X92132003

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