Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Union Influence and Stakeholder Interests
Patrick P. Mchugh,
Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld and
Michael Polzin
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Patrick P. Mchugh: School of Business and Public Management, George Washington University
Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld: F.W. Olin Graduate School of Management, Babson College and Sloan School of Management, MIT
Michael Polzin: School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Michigan State University
Economic and Industrial Democracy, 1999, vol. 20, issue 4, 535-560
Abstract:
This article extends understanding of how institutional factors influence the degree to which employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are or are not democratically structured. It examines how factors such as union member participation, industry, age of the ESOP, ownership structure and firm size influence a range of ESOP attributes, including: level of employee ownership, stock allocations, vesting and voting practices and the extent of employee participation in administration and decision-making. Based on a survey of 68 ESOPs, we found that when bargaining unit workers participated in an ESOP, the plan tended to be more participative and egalitarian. By contrast, the other factors examined had relatively little impact. These findings have important implications for unions, managers and policy-makers around what form of ESOP to advance.
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ecoind:v:20:y:1999:i:4:p:535-560
DOI: 10.1177/0143831X99204003
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