Deregulation of the German Industrial Relations System via Foreign Direct Investment: Are the Subsidiaries of Anglo-Saxon MNCs a Threat for the Institutions of Industrial Democracy in Germany?

Matthias Schmitt

Economic and Industrial Democracy, 2003, vol. 24, issue 3, 349-377

Abstract: This article asks whether the subsidiaries of American and British MNCs operating in Germany act as forces that endanger the traditional German system of industrial democracy by `importing' typical Anglo-Saxon style industrial relations practices into their host nation. In a mail survey based on responses from 297 foreign-owned and local German firms, little evidence was found that Anglo-Saxon-owned subsidiaries act as a threat to the central pillars of Germany's IR system, i.e. codetermination and collective bargaining. This finding contradicts a widely held belief of the erosion of the German IR system and suggests that this system is still strong: foreign companies adapt to local standards so as to retain legitimacy within their host nation's environment.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ecoind:v:24:y:2003:i:3:p:349-377

DOI: 10.1177/0143831X030243003

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