The case for ‘beneficial constraints’: Why permissive voluntarism impedes workplace cooperation in Ireland

Tony Dobbins
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Tony Dobbins: National University of Ireland Galway, Ireland, anthony.dobbins@nuigalway.ie

Economic and Industrial Democracy, 2010, vol. 31, issue 4, 497-519

Abstract: Drawing on existing literature and two case studies of workplace cooperation in Ireland, this article illustrates that although Ireland has had national-level consensus bargaining since 1987, workplace-level cooperation is rare. This can be largely attributed to Ireland’s permissive voluntarist institutional and employment relations context, characterized by limited institutional coordination linking national and workplace governance, and which renders workplaces particularly exposed to the contradictions of capitalism. The result is that few employers construct and maintain workplace bargains with their employees. Focusing on the concept of ‘beneficial constraints’ on employer choice, it is concluded that if efficient and fair workplace coalitions are to increase, the state would need to reform the permissive voluntarism dominating Irish employment relations by ‘reinstitutionalizing’ workplace pluralism through proactive policy interventions.

Keywords: economic change; employee participation; industrial democracy; institutions; labour—management cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ecoind:v:31:y:2010:i:4:p:497-519

DOI: 10.1177/0143831X10365572

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