Works councils, union bargaining and quits in German firms

Christian Pfeifer
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Christian Pfeifer: Leuphana University Lueneburg, Germany, pfeifer@leuphana.de

Economic and Industrial Democracy, 2011, vol. 32, issue 2, 243-260

Abstract: Unsatisfied employees are likely to quit their current job if they have a better outside option. Worker codetermination and union bargaining might increase employees’ utility and make quits unnecessary. The article offers econometric evidence from a large-scale German establishment data set supporting the view that works councils, firm-level and industry-level union bargained collective agreements reduce the number of quits. Moreover, a strong interaction effect between both institutions exists. The results are robust for different subsamples and econometric methods.

Keywords: codetermination; exit-voice; job satisfaction; union; voluntary turnover; works council (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ecoind:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:243-260

DOI: 10.1177/0143831X10377806

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