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Non-union employee representation, union avoidance and the managerial agenda

Jimmy Donaghey, Niall Cullinane, Tony Dundon and Tony Dobbins

Economic and Industrial Democracy, 2012, vol. 33, issue 2, 163-183

Abstract: Non-union employee representation is an area which has attracted much interest in the voice literature. Much of the literature has been shaped by a dialogue which considers NERs as a means of union avoidance. More recently however scholars have suggested that for NERs to work in such contexts, they may need to be imbued with a higher set of functionalities to remain viable entities. Using a critical case study of a union recognition drive and managerial response in the form of an NER, this article contributes to a more nuanced interpretation of the literature dialogue than hitherto exists. A core component of the findings directly challenge existing interpretations within the field; namely that NERs are shaped by a paradox of managerial action. It is argued that the NER failed to satisfy for employees because of a structural remit, rather than through any paradox in managerial intent.

Keywords: case study; managerial intent; non-union representation; union avoidance; worker participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ecoind:v:33:y:2012:i:2:p:163-183

DOI: 10.1177/0143831X11401924

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