The effects of public goods framing for a union default policy
Mark Harcourt,
Gregor Gall and
Margaret Wilson
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Mark Harcourt: University of Waikato, New Zealand
Gregor Gall: University of Leeds, UK
Margaret Wilson: University of Waikato, New Zealand
Economic and Industrial Democracy, 2023, vol. 44, issue 4, 1197-1221
Abstract:
Union provision of collective bargaining and political lobbying generates positive outcomes across society. A union default holds significant promise to revive the flagging fortunes of unions by enabling them to recruit many more members, extend their bargaining coverage, and place them in a stronger position to deliver these positive outcomes. Non-unionism is the default setting in employment arrangements. A union default would reverse this, so employees are defaulted into membership in the first instance, but with a right to opt-out. In this article the authors test whether framing unions as providers of public goods increases worker support for a union default and intention to stay in a union, if defaulted. The authors find that workers are significantly more likely to support a union default and stay in union membership in scenarios involving positive framing for unions.
Keywords: Labour unions; union membership; union organizing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ecoind:v:44:y:2023:i:4:p:1197-1221
DOI: 10.1177/0143831X221120526
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