EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Feuding Families: When Conflict Does a Family Firm Good

Franz Kellermanns and Kimberly A. Eddleston

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2004, vol. 28, issue 3, 209-228

Abstract: Using the conflict theory lens and insights from the family business literature, we develop a theoretical model concerning the effects of task, process, and relationship conflict in family firms. Family firms are characterized by different control structures and generational involvement. Accordingly, we discuss the expected effect control concentration has on task, process, and relationship conflict, and propose that generational involvement affects the importance of task and process conflict to a family firm's performance. Furthermore, our model suggests that relationship conflict moderates the outcomes of task and process conflict. The degree of relationship conflict in family firms is in turn influenced by altruism, which characterizes interactions among family members.

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (143)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2004.00040.x (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:entthe:v:28:y:2004:i:3:p:209-228

DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2004.00040.x

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:sae:entthe:v:28:y:2004:i:3:p:209-228