How Family Firms Solve Intra–Family Agency Problems Using Interlocking Directorates: An Extension

Jess H. Chua, Lloyd P. Steier and James J. Chrisman

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2006, vol. 30, issue 6, 777-783

Abstract: This commentary makes two contributions to a better understanding of interlocking directorates in family firms. First, we compare agency costs in family and nonfamily firms. Second, we present additional propositions on how interlocking directorates address agency issues in family firms.

Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:entthe:v:30:y:2006:i:6:p:777-783

DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2006.00150.x

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