Syndication of Venture Capital Investment: The Art of Resource Pooling

Michel Ferrary

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2010, vol. 34, issue 5, 885-908

Abstract: This article explores the rationale of syndications of institutional venture capital investors when they fund start–ups. There is an implicit labor division between institutional venture capital investors in which pure venture capital firms are in charge of converting investment uncertainty into risk by funding the seed stage of start–ups. The other investors invest in the following stages to sustain the start–ups‘ development. Relationships between investors are also handled following informal rules. Exchanges between institutional venture capital investors are based on a reciprocity that follows the informal principles of the gift exchange theory.

Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:entthe:v:34:y:2010:i:5:p:885-908

DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2009.00356.x

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