Pound of Flesh? Debt Contract Strictness and Family Firms*

David Hillier, Beatriz Martínez, Pankaj C. Patel, Julio Pindado and Ignacio Requejo

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2018, vol. 42, issue 2, 259-282

Abstract: While past work finds support for both higher and lower cost of debt among family firms, whether lower shareholder–creditor agency conflicts in family firms translate into greater ex-ante contracting efficiency (i.e., lower debt contract strictness) remains unexplored. Drawing on a shareholder–creditor agency framework and costly contracting theory, creditors, expecting firm value maximization rather than shareholder value maximization from family firms, may offer less strict debt contracts to increase contracting efficiency. We find in a sample of 716 publicly traded U.S. firms (2001–2010) that family firms have less strict debt contracts, which are even less strict when family firms have higher asset tangibility. Although increases in R&D investments could lead to more pronounced shareholder–creditor agency conflicts, given family firms' preferences for lower risk and growth, debt contract strictness among family firms is not positively associated with higher R&D intensity.

Keywords: debt contracts; family firms; financial covenant slack; asset tangibility; R&D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:entthe:v:42:y:2018:i:2:p:259-282

DOI: 10.1177/1042258717748933

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