Political Bias in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions

William N. Cooke and Frederick H. Gautschi

ILR Review, 1982, vol. 35, issue 4, 539-549

Abstract: Previous research has suggested that U.S. presidents appoint members to the National Labor Relations Board who reflect the administration's own union-management predilections. No adequate empirical evidence has yet been reported, however, to show that, once appointed, Board members act in a biased manner. The present study develops and tests a choice model of Board member decisions in selected unfair labor practice cases over the 1954–77 period. The evidence strongly supports the popular belief that Board decisions are heavily dependent upon shifting political winds.

Date: 1982
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:35:y:1982:i:4:p:539-549

DOI: 10.1177/001979398203500406

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