A Conceptualization of Collective Bargaining Power

Terry L. Leap and David W. Grigsby

ILR Review, 1986, vol. 39, issue 2, 202-213

Abstract: Although power relationships have a significant impact on outcomes in collective negotiation, few theoretical treatments of the determinants of power in collective bargaining have been developed. Building on a general theory of bargaining power developed by Bacharach and Lawler, the authors present a comprehensive model of power in collective bargaining. They suggest that power stems from multiple legal, economic, social, and structural sources that are controllable to varying degrees by union and management. When combined with certain “transformational factors,†such as commitment to the bargaining relationship and information available to the parties, potential bargaining power is converted to the actual power that union and management negotiators bring to bear on a collective bargaining relationship. Practical applications and suggestions for further research are discussed.

Date: 1986
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:39:y:1986:i:2:p:202-213

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