A Yo-Yo Model of Cooperation: Union Participation in Management at the Rath Packing Company

Tove H. Hammer and Robert N. Stern

ILR Review, 1986, vol. 39, issue 3, 337-349

Abstract: The authors hypothesize that union leaders who enter into union-management cooperative programs alternate between cooperative and adversarial behavior: they agree to cooperate in order to avert corporate ruin or obtain benefits, but revert to their adversarial view of labor-management relations when cooperation incurs costs to the union or threatens their control of union members. Analysis of union-management collaboration at the Rath Packing Company between 1978 and 1985 shows that during the life of that program, the union leaders withdrew from and returned to collaboration three times, in response to changes in the cost to the union of continued participation.

Date: 1986
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://ilr.sagepub.com/content/39/3/337.abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:39:y:1986:i:3:p:337-349

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in ILR Review from Cornell University, ILR School
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().