Strikes, Strike Penalties, and Arbitration in Six States

Craig A. Olson

ILR Review, 1986, vol. 39, issue 4, 539-551

Abstract: This paper examines the frequency of public sector strikes through 1980 in six states that have different public policies toward such strikes. From the results of cross-sectional and time series analyses, the author concludes that well-enforced penalties against participants in illegal strikes (in New York) and the threat of firings in response to strikes (Wisconsin) appear to have reduced strike frequency, whereas poorly enforced prohibitions against public sector strikes (Ohio) had no effect, and the legalization of public sector strikes (Pennsylvania) increased strike frequency. Policies affecting the rescheduling of school days missed because of teacher strikes significantly affected the probability of teacher strikes. The results also suggest, less strongly, that interest arbitration decreased strike frequency.

Date: 1986
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:39:y:1986:i:4:p:539-551

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