A Test of an Efficiency Model of Grievance Activity

Peter Cappelli and Keith Chauvin

ILR Review, 1991, vol. 45, issue 1, 3-14

Abstract: The authors develop a model in which the extent of use of a grievance system is determined by wage premiums and alternative job opportunities. Specifically, they hypothesize that when workers enjoy comparatively high wages or are faced with poor alternative job opportunities, they are less likely to use withdrawal mechanisms that might lead to dismissal (such as shirking or absenteeism) and more likely to use grievance procedures to address workplace problems. The results of an analysis of data for the year 1982 from a large manufacturing company are consistent with this hypothesis.

Date: 1991
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