Measuring the Effect of Arbitration on Wage Levels: The Case of Police Officers

Orley Ashenfelter and Dean Hyslop

ILR Review, 2001, vol. 54, issue 2, 316-328

Abstract: The authors empirically evaluate how the provision of an arbitration statute affects police officers' wages by comparing wage levels across political jurisdictions and over time using a sample of states. Two complementary data sources are used: panel data for the years 1961–92 on state-level wages of police officers, and individual-level data on police officers from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Decennial Censuses. The empirical results from both data sets are remarkably consistent and provide no robust evidence that the presence of arbitration statutes systematically affected overall wage levels. On average, the effect of arbitration was approximately zero, although the authors find substantial heterogeneity in the estimated effects across states.

Date: 2001
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Related works:
Working Paper: Measuring the Effects of Arbitration on Wage Levels: The Case of Police Officers (1999)
Working Paper: Measuring the Effect of Arbitration on Wage Levels: The Case of Police Officers (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:54:y:2001:i:2:p:316-328

DOI: 10.1177/001979390105400207

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