Do Highly Unionized Companies Compensate Their CEOs Less in Periods of Financial Distress? Evidence from Canada

Muhammad Umar Boodoo

ILR Review, 2018, vol. 71, issue 2, 306-328

Abstract: In this article, the author studies the strategic interaction between employee stakeholders, in particular labor unions, and top management, and he evaluates the effect of the two parties’ inherent competitive rent-seeking behavior on CEO pay. Using a panel of firms listed on the S&P/TSX Composite Index, the author shows that CEO compensation withstood the financial crisis (2008–2011) despite lower and even negative corporate performance. Further, highly unionized companies were associated with higher CEO pay in terms of non-equity elements such as salary and pension allocations. The presence of unions had no observed effect in reducing bonuses, stock options, and restricted stock units. These findings have implications for the debate on income inequality and the power of unions to bring about change.

Keywords: economic inequality; executive labor market; executive pay; Great Recession; labor union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:71:y:2018:i:2:p:306-328

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