Third-Party Intervention and the Preservation of Bargaining Relationships

Bradley R. Weinberg

ILR Review, 2020, vol. 73, issue 2, 498-527

Abstract: This article uses longitudinal bargaining contract data to examine whether third-party dispute resolution procedures improve the health of bargaining relationships and contribute to their preservation. The author uses survival analysis to assess whether the procedures correlate with the likelihood of relationship dissolution. This analysis shows that earlier procedures in the dispute resolution process, such as conciliation and mediation, are related to a lower likelihood of dissolution than are later ones. The author then uses dynamic panel models to consider whether third-party intervention pushes the parties to settle subsequent collective agreements voluntarily or earlier in the process, but he finds no evidence to this effect.

Keywords: collective bargaining; dispute resolution; survival analysis; dynamic panel models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:73:y:2020:i:2:p:498-527

DOI: 10.1177/0019793919864263

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