Between Legitimacy and Cost: Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining Rights in Global Supply Chains

Chunyun Li, Sarosh Kuruvilla and Jinsun Bae

ILR Review, 2025, vol. 78, issue 3, 435-462

Abstract: Scholars and practitioners have advocated for freedom of association and collective bargaining (FOA/CB) rights as a key mechanism to improve labor compliance in global supply chains. Drawing on a longitudinal data set comprising 6,500 Better Work factory assessments across seven countries from 2015 to 2021, the authors compare violations of various FOA/CB elements to provide a general picture of the progress and problems of FOA/CB in supplier workplaces. They argue that suppliers are likely to selectively comply with FOA/CB elements that afford them some legitimacy but will violate the elements that impose significant costs on them. Specifically, the authors find fewer violations of union formation rights, in contrast to higher violations of union operation rights and of collective bargaining rights. Yet, when these latter rights are respected, they are associated with better compliance with other employment standards, with effective collective bargaining having the strongest effect.

Keywords: labor standards; global supply chains; freedom of association; collective bargaining; private regulation; corporate codes of conduct; apparel industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:78:y:2025:i:3:p:435-462

DOI: 10.1177/00197939251314867

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