EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Comparison of Sequential and Simultaneous Responding, Matrix, and Strategy Variables in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Stuart Oskamp
Additional contact information
Stuart Oskamp: Department of Psychology Claremont Graduate School

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1974, vol. 18, issue 1, 107-116

Abstract: This experiment systematically compared the effects of simultaneous responding and sequential responding by subjects, using a 2 x 4 x 2 factorial design. The four strategy conditions were 10% Cooperation, 90% Cooperation, Tit-for-Tat (response- matching with a one-trial lag), and Free-Play (two subjects actually paired). The two PD matrices had average expected payoffs of $.00 and $.025 per trial. Subjects were 160 college freshman women volunteers who served in groups of two or four and were paid for their participation. Overall cooperation was moderately high (56%). The significant findings were a strategy effect (10% Cooperation lowest, then 90% Cooperation, Free-Play, Tit-for-Tat highest), an increase in cooperation across the fifty trials, an interaction of trials with strategies, and an interaction of matrices with response procedures. The latter finding supports the experimental hypothesis that simultaneous and sequential responding do not have equivalent effects.

Date: 1974
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200277401800105 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:18:y:1974:i:1:p:107-116

DOI: 10.1177/002200277401800105

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:18:y:1974:i:1:p:107-116