Toward an Explanation of Experimentally Obtained Outcomes to a Simple, Majority Rule Game

T. Edward Westen and James J. Buckley
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T. Edward Westen: Department of Government and International Studies University of South Carolina
James J. Buckley: Department of Mathematics and Computer Science University of South Carolina

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1974, vol. 18, issue 2, 198-236

Abstract: The problem of so embarrassingly many solutions to n-person games is examined through the vehicle of a four-person simple, majority rule game. Ninety-seven experimental trials are employed to demonstrate that three different solutions (symmetric, inflated, and partitioned solutions) can be differentially predicted as one varies the structural characteristics of otherwise strictly identical games in character istic function form. The authors interpret their findings as an indication that systematic theory construction about the structure of conflict is a fruitful area for inquiry.

Date: 1974
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:18:y:1974:i:2:p:198-236

DOI: 10.1177/002200277401800202

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