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Sex Differences as Artifact in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Vincent Skotko, Daniel Langmeyer and David Lundgren
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Vincent Skotko: Department of Psychology University of Cincinnati
Daniel Langmeyer: Department of Psychology University of Cincinnati
David Lundgren: Department of Psychology University of Cincinnati

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1974, vol. 18, issue 4, 707-713

Abstract: Female subject pairs have often been found to compete more than either male pairs or mixed sex pairs in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. It was hypothesized that sex differences in the PD were in part a function of the sex of the experimenter. Three males and three females served as experimenters. The hypothesis was supported for, although females evidenced higher competition with male Es, no sex differences were found with female Es. Female subject pairs were, however, the only pairs which evidenced significant differences in level of competition under male and female Es. Results were discussed in terms of greater sensitivity on the part of female Ss than male Ss to characteristics of both the partner and the E. Implications for the design of experimental investigation of sex differences were also considered.

Date: 1974
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:18:y:1974:i:4:p:707-713

DOI: 10.1177/002200277401800411

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