Minimum Resource and Pivotal Power Theories

H. Andrew Michener, John A. Fleishman, Jerry J. Vaske and Gerald R. Statza
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H. Andrew Michener: Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin-Madison
John A. Fleishman: Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin-Madison
Jerry J. Vaske: Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin-Madison
Gerald R. Statza: Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin-Madison

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1975, vol. 19, issue 1, 89-107

Abstract: This paper reports a competitive test of minimum resource and pivotal power theories in tetradic situations. Using resource distributions for which the theories make distinct predictions, the study obtained data on the formation of coalitions and the division of payoffs. Results indicate that minimum resource theory is superior to pivotal power theory in predicting coalition formation, especially for resource distributions where one member has veto capabilities. The theories perform equally well in predicting payoff division, with each able to explain a large proportion of the variation. Both theories are more accurate in predicting payoff division for nonveto situations than for veto situations

Date: 1975
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:19:y:1975:i:1:p:89-107

DOI: 10.1177/002200277501900105

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