Decisions of Timing in Conflict Situations of Unequal Power Between Opponents

James P. Kahan and Amnon Rapoport
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James P. Kahan: Department of Psychology University of Southern California

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1975, vol. 19, issue 2, 250-270

Abstract: Games of timing constitute a subclass of two-person, zero-sum, infinite games, where the problem facing each player is not what course of action to take, but rather when to take a prespecified action. The present study is an extension of previous research on games of timing with complete information (noisy duels) and equal accuracy functions, to noisy duels with unequal accuracy functions. The game-theoretic solution of this class of games, which has been recently derived, is briefly presented. Ten pairs of male subjects participated in two sessions each in a computer-controlled noisy duel experiment. Each pair played 256 duels in which both the accuracy functions and the starting number of bullets were varied systematically. The results are analyzed and discussed in terms of predictions derived from the game-theoretic solution.

Date: 1975
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:19:y:1975:i:2:p:250-270

DOI: 10.1177/002200277501900203

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