Criteria of Choice in Non-Constant-Sum Games

Tadeusz Tyszka and Janusz L. Grzelak
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Tadeusz Tyszka: Polish Academy of Science
Janusz L. Grzelak: University of Warsaw and Institute for Youth Research

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1976, vol. 20, issue 2, 357-376

Abstract: Experiments were performed on single-shot 2×2×2×2×2 games (five players with two strategies each). Variants of the following types of games were used: (1) no conflict, in which the “cooperative†strategy C is always more advantageous than the “noncooperative†strategy D; (2) Steering Others' Fate, in which any single player is indifferent between C and D but, by choosing D, increases the others' payoffs; (3) five-person Prisoner's Dilemma; (4) Justified Trust, in which it is most advantageous to choose C only if everyone else does so; and (5) five-person Chicken. As expected, the fraction of players choosing C was largest in no-conflict games and smallest in Prisoner's Dilemma. The behavioral results were compared with players' and control nonplayers' predictions about the fractions of C choices. Fractions predicted were consistently larger than those observed. In all games, Ss who chose predominantly C expected higher levels of C than those who chose predominantly D.

Date: 1976
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:20:y:1976:i:2:p:357-376

DOI: 10.1177/002200277602000207

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