Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process

William Zartman
Additional contact information
William Zartman: Department of Politics New York University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1977, vol. 21, issue 4, 619-638

Abstract: Negotiation is one of a limited number of decision-making modes whose characteristics, taken as assumptions, are not compatible with most of the theoretical work on negotiation to date. The concession/ convergence approach has problems of symmetry, determinism, and power, but above all fails to reflect the nature of negotiation as practiced. Negotiators begin by groping for a jointly agreeable formula that will serve as a referent, provide a notion of justice, and define a common perception on which implementing details can be based. Power makes the values fit together in the package and timing is important to making the formula stick. The article provides examples from cases and experiments are discussed, including the results of a new survey of UN ambassadors using miniscenarios. Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of the formula/detail approach are assessed.

Date: 1977
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200277702100405 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:21:y:1977:i:4:p:619-638

DOI: 10.1177/002200277702100405

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().