Equilibrium Payoff Configurations for Cooperative Games with Transferability

Chal Sussangkarn
Additional contact information
Chal Sussangkarn: University of California, Berkeley

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1978, vol. 22, issue 1, 121-141

Abstract: This paper introduces some concepts of equilibrium payoff configurations for n-person games. They are based on the idea that a coalition must be sufficiently stable to break away from a particular payoff configuration and are extensions of the core and the bargaining sets The question of general existence is dealt with, as well as interesting dynamic properties in three-person games

Date: 1978
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200277802200108 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:22:y:1978:i:1:p:121-141

DOI: 10.1177/002200277802200108

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().