National Security and the Concept of Strategic Stability

John D. Steinbruner
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John D. Steinbruner: Yale University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1978, vol. 22, issue 3, 411-428

Abstract: Strategic stability has been defined as a characteristic of deterrence based on mutual assured destruction and has been measured largely in terms of the potential vulnerability of strategic force components, notably land-based missiles. This conception does not incorporate the effects on the strategic balance of the opposing systems of command, communications and control which given current force levels constitutes perhaps its most sensitive dimension. The implications of command structure stability are explored and found to contradict the prescriptions derived from the standard definition. This fact poses a major analytic problem and casts serious doubt on any conclusions about desirable changes in force structure until reasonable trade-offs are established between the conflicting principles.

Date: 1978
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:22:y:1978:i:3:p:411-428

DOI: 10.1177/002200277802200303

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