Inducing Cooperation by Groups and Individuals: Applying Osgood's Grit Strategy

Svenn Lindskold and Michael G. Collins
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Svenn Lindskold: Ohio University
Michael G. Collins: Ohio University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1978, vol. 22, issue 4, 679-690

Abstract: Thirty-two groups and an equal number of individuals opposed one of four programmed strategies, presumably carried out by an individual, in a 30-trial Prisoner's Dilemma situation. The programmed strategies included (a) a GRIT strategy involving a general statement of intent, specific announcements of choices, and some retaliation to exploitation; (b) a competitive strategy in which announcements were used deceitfully; (c) a tit-for-tat strategy without any verbal communication; and (d) a 50% cooperative control strategy. For both groups and individuals the GRIT strategy promoted more cooperation than any of the other three. This difference vanished toward the end of the third block of ten trials in which all four strategies involved consistent, unannounced cooperation. Females were more cooperative than males. It was concluded that GRIT is as effective with groups as with individuals, even though prior research indicates groups to be less conciliatory in their preference for influence modes and at times less cooperative than individuals.

Date: 1978
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:22:y:1978:i:4:p:679-690

DOI: 10.1177/002200277802200406

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