The Finite Negotiation Problem

Peter Rice
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Peter Rice: Department of Mathematics, University of Georgia

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1979, vol. 23, issue 3, 561-576

Abstract: A finite negotiation problem is a finite, two-person, non-zero-sum noncooperative game. A negotiated solution to a problem is an outcome associated with two pure strategies, one for each player, which is arrived at by a negotiation process. The problem posed and solved in this article is the specification of a solution theory which reflects the expectations of negotiators and captures the strategic possibilities implicit in the original game. Instead of approaching the theory through axioms which imply the existence of a unique solution, this study describes a negotiating scenario which, when exactly described, is itself a game. Given the information of who moves first in the negotiation game, there is an equilibrium outcome, and this is taken as the solution of the problem.

Date: 1979
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:23:y:1979:i:3:p:561-576

DOI: 10.1177/002200277902300309

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