How a War Ends
Donald Wittman
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1979, vol. 23, issue 4, 743-763
Abstract:
This article discusses the necessary conditions for two countries at war to come to a settlement and explores how domestic and military costs, time preferences and attitudes toward risk affect the timing and the outcome of the peace. It views the termination of war as a process of rational calculations by the participants; unless both sides believe that they can be made better off by a settlement, the war will continue. An important result of this approach is that a reduction of hostilities may reduce the probability of a settlement taking place and thus prolong the war. It is also shown that increasing the probability of winning may not increase the probability of a settlement and that a country which only values the present need not be at a disadvantage in the negotiation.
Date: 1979
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:23:y:1979:i:4:p:743-763
DOI: 10.1177/002200277902300408
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