Selective Incentives in an Apex Game

Pamela Oliver
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Pamela Oliver: Sociology Department, University of Louisville

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1980, vol. 24, issue 1, 113-141

Abstract: The effect of a selective incentive system on the likelihood of collective action is tested using an experiment with an Apex Game, a power-imbalanced game in which the weak players choose between competing against each other to form an alliance with the strong player or cooperating with each other in a unanimous alliance of weak players (excluding the strong player). A theoretical introduction analyzes the nature and importance of selective incentives for collective action and demonstrates the relevance of Apex Game experiments for studies of collective action. Results confirm the predictions: Formation of the coalition of weak players rises from 20% in the control condition to 62% when a negative selective incentive system is added.

Date: 1980
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:24:y:1980:i:1:p:113-141

DOI: 10.1177/002200278002400105

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