In Defense of a Collective Goods Theory of Alliances

Todd Sandler, Jon Cauley and John F. Forbes
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Jon Cauley: Department of Economics University of Hawaii—Hilo
John F. Forbes: Social Paediatric and Obstetric Research Unit University of Glasgow—Scotland

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1980, vol. 24, issue 3, 537-547

Abstract: This article defends the collective goods theory of alliances by showing that club theory is an appropriate tool for analyzing allocative issues of alliances from a positive prospective. The article concludes with a demonstration that Oppenheimer made an analytical mistake when he questioned the normative importance of Pareto optimality.

Date: 1980
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:24:y:1980:i:3:p:537-547

DOI: 10.1177/002200278002400308

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