Reward, Punishment, and Interdependence

Richard Rosecrance
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Richard Rosecrance: Center for International Studies Cornell University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1981, vol. 25, issue 1, 31-46

Abstract: This essay seeks to show that the successful use of reward and punishment is related to the degree of interdependence among the parties. Where the relationship is one of "independence," A cannot influence B using either technique. Where the relationship is one of "interdependence," rewards and punishments can be easily given, and they are likely to be of influence. On the other hand, once given it will not be easy to withdraw "rewards." Thus no unilateral influence process is established. Where the relationship is one of "dependence" of B on A, both "rewards" and "punishments" are influential. The analytical conclusions of the essay are used to help explain why World War II could not have been prevented using "rewards" and why World War I (under different circumstances of sensitivity to opponent interests) might have been obviated or postponed by the judicious use of "reward."

Date: 1981
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:25:y:1981:i:1:p:31-46

DOI: 10.1177/002200278102500102

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