Intraparty Dissensus and Interparty Conflict Resolution

Dan Jacobson
Additional contact information
Dan Jacobson: Department of Labor Studies Tel-Aviv University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1981, vol. 25, issue 3, 471-494

Abstract: In replicating an experimental design originally tested in a simulated intraorganiza tional bargaining setting, four combinations of bargaining patterns were employed in a laboratory simulation in which interrelated aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were negotiated. The principal objective was to test the effect of intraparty consensus-dissensus bargaining patterns with extremist-moderate position intensities on the outcomes of interparty negotiations between Arab and Jewish students. Two hypotheses were tested: (1) Intraparty differences, if manifested openly by both parties (bilateral dissensus), would generate more points of agreement, and a greater number of integrative outcomes, than bilateral consensus and unilateral dissensus; (2) a party which exposes its internal differences between moderates and extremists to an adversary that presents a unanimous and extremist strategy would tend to be dominated. Results confirmed the first hypothesis but failed to yield clear-cut support for the second. An attempt is made to explain and discuss the implications of these results in the context of the Middle East conflict.

Date: 1981
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200278102500304 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:25:y:1981:i:3:p:471-494

DOI: 10.1177/002200278102500304

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().