Utilitarianism and the Conflict of Interests

J. Moreh
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J. Moreh: Department of Economics, Queen's University of Belfast

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1985, vol. 29, issue 1, 137-159

Abstract: Utilitarianism has most relevance to “helping behavior†where the agent's action is parametric, that is, the behavior of others can be taken as given. The utilitarian principle has also been applied to strategic behavior, that is, behavior that can be represented by a game. It is shown in this article that the utilitarian objective may conflict with common sense ethics, and where it does not, questions of equity may arise for which Utilitarianism has no answer. Utilitarian writers have paid scant attention to the games of exchange and externality. In neither of these games does the utilitarian approach agree with our moral intuitions. Apart from this, if all goods either entered into exchange or gave rise to externalities, then the utilitarian solution to these problems would be tantamount to a distribution of welfare that maximized total utility. Such a distribution would be unfair to those who have a relatively low capacity to enjoy goods and to those who suffer negative externalities but impose light ones on others or none at all.

Date: 1985
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:29:y:1985:i:1:p:137-159

DOI: 10.1177/0022002785029001007

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