Choices in Social Dilemmas

Sanford L. Braver and L. A. Wilson
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Sanford L. Braver: Department of Psychology Arizona State University
L. A. Wilson: Center for Public Affairs, Arizona State University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1986, vol. 30, issue 1, 51-62

Abstract: In a public-goods game, a variant of the social dilemma, 126 subjects made choices. In an attempt to better represent real-world communication possibilities, two conditions were created. In the subgroup communication condition, subjects were divided into subgroups. Discussion was allowed within but not between the subgroups. A control condition allowed no communication. Results showed that cooperation was significantly increased but not to the level at which the public good was absolutely reliably obtained, as had been obtained with full communication by Simmons (1980). Questionnaire data were interpreted as suggestive evidence that one's own choice may affect one's expectations about other people's choices, rather than vice versa.

Date: 1986
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:30:y:1986:i:1:p:51-62

DOI: 10.1177/0022002786030001004

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