Negotiating Strategic Arms Control, 1969-1979

Richard J. Stoll and William McAndrew
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William McAndrew: Department of Political Science, Rice University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1986, vol. 30, issue 2, 315-326

Abstract: Using data collected by Jensen (1984), we investigate whether cooperative and inverse reciprocity can successfully predict U.S. and Soviet actions during the 23 rounds of strategic arms negotiation during the 1969-1979 period. Each type of reciprocity gives rise to three models of bargaining behavior, which we implement as computer routines. In our analysis, we find that the cooperative reciprocity models fit more often than inverse reciprocity models.

Date: 1986
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:30:y:1986:i:2:p:315-326

DOI: 10.1177/0022002786030002005

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