Time Pressure and the Development of Integrative Agreements in Bilateral Negotiations

Peter J.D. Carnevale and Edward J. Lawler
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Peter J.D. Carnevale: Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Edward J. Lawler: Department of Sociology, University of Iowa

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1986, vol. 30, issue 4, 636-659

Abstract: A laboratory experiment examined the effects of time pressure on the process and outcome of integrative bargaining. Time pressure was operationalized in terms of the amount of time available to negotiate. As hypothesized, high time pressure produced nonagreements and poor negotiation outcomes only when negotiators adopted an individualistic orientation; when negotiators adopted a cooperative orientation, they achieved high outcomes regardless of time pressure. In combination with an individualistic orientation, time pressure produced greater competitiveness, firm negotiator aspirations, and reduced information exchange. In combination with a cooperative orientation, time pressure produced greater cooperativeness and lower negotiator aspirations. The main findings were seen as consistent with Pruitt's strategic-choice model of negotiation.

Date: 1986
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:30:y:1986:i:4:p:636-659

DOI: 10.1177/0022002786030004003

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