Balanced Strategies for Prisoner's Dilemma

Michael Orkin
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Michael Orkin: Department of Statistics, California State University, Hayward

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1987, vol. 31, issue 1, 186-191

Abstract: When is a strategy cooperative, yet safe from invasion? A mathematical characterization of such strategies is given, which I call “balanced.†I show that tit-for-tat is balanced, and, in general, a strategy is balanced if and only if its probability of defection on a particular move is sufficiently large relative to the opponent's cumulative score and sufficiently low relative to its own cumulative score.

Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:31:y:1987:i:1:p:186-191

DOI: 10.1177/0022002787031001010

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