Perceptual Illusions and Military Realities

S. Plous
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S. Plous: Department of Psychology, Stanford University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1987, vol. 31, issue 1, 5-33

Abstract: Traditionally, the most common game-theoretic model of the nuclear arms race has been the Prisoner's Dilemma, in which participants are bound in conflict by the structure of the situation. Recent evidence suggests, however, that the nuclear arms race may be better approximated by a “Perceptual Dilemma†arising from discrepant perceptions of various outcome utilities. The present experiment compared the effects of two strategies, a matching strategy (called Status Quo) and a matching strategy preceded by unconditional cooperation (called Disarmament Initiatives), within the context of a Prisoner's Dilemma or a Perceptual Dilemma. Results indicated that: (a) the Status Quo strategy sustained competitive behavior, attitudes, and emotions in both the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Perceptual Dilemma; and (b) the Disarmament Initiatives strategy induced significantly more cooperation among subjects locked in a Perceptual Dilemma than those in a Prisoner's Dilemma. The limitations, extensions, and implications of these findings are discussed in terms of political action and future research.

Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:31:y:1987:i:1:p:5-33

DOI: 10.1177/0022002787031001002

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