Viable Alternatives to the Status Quo
James D. Laing and
Benjamin Slotznick
Additional contact information
James D. Laing: Department of Decision Sciences, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Benjamin Slotznick: Department of Public Policy and Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1987, vol. 31, issue 1, 63-85
Abstract:
Collective decision making occurs within constraints associated with the option to maintain the status quo. If this default option is sufficiently attractive to participants and the rules imply that blocking coalitions can form, then these constraints delimit the decision problem's core solution—the most important solution concept in the theory of cooperative games. The results presented in this article demonstrate that these constraints have important effects on the outcomes of collective decisions, regardless of whether or not the problem has a core solution. In the laboratory situation, a five-person committee makes a separate decision under four-fifths majority rule about each in a series of six distinct choice problems. This design enables us to analyze the independent effects of variations in the status quo on the outcomes of collective-decision problems in which blocking coalitions are possible, controlling for whether or not the game has a core solution.
Date: 1987
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002787031001005 (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:31:y:1987:i:1:p:63-85
DOI: 10.1177/0022002787031001005
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().