Experiments with N-Person Social Traps II

Anatol Rapoport
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Anatol Rapoport: University College, University of Toronto

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1988, vol. 32, issue 3, 473-488

Abstract: A version of the Tragedy of the Commons was played by 16 four-person groups, 2 three-person groups, and 1 two-person group. Calculation of individually rational equilibria for the seven-round game was out of the question. The collectively rational strategy, on the other hand, is salient: No one is to draw from the common resource pool for the first six rounds, allowing the pool to double each round; then each is to claim an equal share of the pool, which has increasedby by a factor of 64. The game was presented under two conditions: minimal and full instructions, the latter including the disclosure of the collectively rational strategy. None of the four-person groups and neither of the two three-person groups achieved the optimal result. Only the single two-person group cooperated all the way, refraining from drawing from the pool until the last round and harvesting $38.40 on the final round. This pair was given the full instructions. Full instructions did have a positive effect, however, raising the level of cooperation as measured by several indices.

Date: 1988
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:32:y:1988:i:3:p:473-488

DOI: 10.1177/0022002788032003004

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