Polarity, Power, and Risk in International Disputes

Grace Iusi Scarborough
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Grace Iusi Scarborough: National Security Analysis Division, The Orkand Corporation

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1988, vol. 32, issue 3, 511-533

Abstract: This study sets forth a theoretical model of decision making in crisis situations, specifying the manner in which polarity, power, and risk taking enter into the decision calculus. It is argued that the constraints and advantages imposed on a nation by the polarity structure of the system and the power capabilities of the disputants, when filtered through the risk propensity of the decision maker, offer a powerful explanation of the way in which a conflict will be resolved. The hypothesis derived from the model is empirically supported. This support suggests that national leaders calculate the potential value of relevant poles in the manner specified and the difference in capabilities of the two nations in dispute when making decisions in crisis situations. Further, the risk-taking orientation of a decision maker is critical in determining the perceptions of these factors.

Date: 1988
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:32:y:1988:i:3:p:511-533

DOI: 10.1177/0022002788032003006

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